Reviewed by Mwalimu George Ngwane (Originally published in Conflict Trends Magazine, Issue 2; August 2008).
Khadiagala, Gilbert M. 2007. Meddlers or mediators?: African interveners in civil conflicts in Eastern Africa. International negotiation series, v. 4. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff. 274 pages.
In eight chapters, 274 pages and five case studies Gilbert M. Khadiagala’s graphically detailed and well researched book sheds light on the vagary of conflict mediation through citizen-led (elder statesmen), state-centric and regionally – driven initiatives. At first reading the book concentrates on cases studies of civil wars within the Eastern region of Africa but beyond this, lies a profile portrait of those involved or intend to be involved in the complex and cumbersome search for peace in a conflict – prone Africa.
After identifying three categories of mediators (state, elder statesmen and regional institutions), the cross-cutting picture that Khadiagala paints of any mediator in Chapter One “having muscle, clout and leverage,” “having both power and stature to reward or to punish the disputants for cooperative or uncooperative behaviour” and “having deeper knowledge of the conflict and proximity to the disputants”.
The Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and Threat (SWOT) analysis is appropriate in summarizing the major concerns raised in this book.
The major concern of “mediator profile” has its strengths and weaknesses while the other concern of “mediation process” and “disputant involvement” offers vistas of opportunities and threats.
Mediators derive their strength from invitation by conflicting parties. This invitation is fed on the mediator’s organizational capacity for with “limited tangible and material resources, African interveners have contributed to the widespread perception of being meddlers rather than mediators. They intervene out of necessary but without the means to be effective (P.6). Devoid of tangible and organizational power, meddlers are “prone to squander the opportunities of invitation and entry” (P.10). This organizational power tool is what draws the line between the book’s first case study (Moi mediates Uganda’s civil war, 1985) and the fourth case study (Mandela mediates Burundi’s civil war 1995 – 1999). While Moi surrendered his organizational power by failing to assume control in the conflict as well as his inability to wield his mediation power (P.47), Mandela’s moral authority, expertise in persuasive debate, authoritative stature, and international connection made him to put his own imprimatur on the negotiations (Chapter Five).
Another strength is the mediator’s prescriptive power i.e being interested in both process and outcome; Under the book’s Second case study (Tanzania mediates Rwanda’s civil war 1992 – 1993) there are a series of multi.-track diplomatic negotiations with a multi lateral character (sometimes raising the problem of crowdedness) by President Mobutu and President Mwinyi as well as the Egypt – Libya and IGAD involvement seen in Chapters Six and Seven. While Mwinyi’s policy gave the belligerents a detailed blueprint for the resolution of the underlying causes of the Rwandan conflict (P.95) Mobutu’s aloofness and lack of a moral fiber transformed him into a nominal mediator (p.68).
Yet another significant strength is packaged in what I call “innate personal baggage “like track record of success story, creativity, imaginative, innovation and power devolution. Most of these sterling qualities have been germane to the relative success in the Rwandan and Burundi peace deals illustrated in Chapters three, four and five.
The weaknesses or short comings of all the mediators (citizen, state or regional bloc) mentioned in the book are common, with a difference only in details and specificity. From the lack of a clear agenda, lack of independent initiative, lack of fall back positions, lack of understanding of the position of the conflicting parties as exemplified by Moi’s handling of the Uganda civil war in Chapter Two, through the real or perceived partiality, procedural battles, overbearing role, limits of institutional leverage and over-dependence on external resources as seen in Nyerere’s Mwanza Peace process in Chapter Four, to the nominal role, error in judgment and futile diplomatic initiatives that Mobutu manifested in Tanzania’s mediation process (pp 58 – 68).
Even with mediation by regional bodies like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) mediation role in Sudan’s civil war which is thoroughly examined in Chapters Six and Seven, one observes that the regional mediator’s neutrality, moral exhortation, international leverage, knowledge, proximity and collective pressure are undermined by its membership rivalry (Moi and Mobutu)p.197,competitive and parallel mediation initiatives (Egypt, Libya, IGAD) p.204 , and conflicting strategies of the carrot and the stick (pp 193, 201,203 and 208).
Paradoxically some of the weaknesses or shortcomings of the mediators are compounded by the threat of the disputants (incremental demands, shifting interest, lack of trust, boycott to meetings, formation of splinter groups, diametrically opposed agendas, overbearing or dictatorial attitudes, renewed hostilities and lack of willingness and commitment) and compensated for by the opportunities that the mediation process provides (frequent consultations, respect of fractioned engagements, concession-making, external pressure, de-escalation of crises due to war weariness, and the consensual choice of new mediators).
As part of the professionalizing package that the author prescribes in Chapters Seven and Eight, it is relevant to add that institutions (like IGAD), other regional bodies through pivotal states and especially the Peace and Security Council of the African Union need to be exposed to the mediation skills and institutional capacity-building techniques to accommodate the volatile paradigms of conflict management in Africa. These institutions need only to surmount the organizational inadequacies that an early and less “professionalized” IGAD exhibited in Chapter Six (time – consuming machinery, vested interest, lack of visible authority, cautious or passive observer etc) and focus on a later and more “professionalized “IGAD (Chapter Seven) that learnt to combine “the punitive and benign hat, “the viable and tactical autonomy”. Fortunately for the reader Chapter Eight provides an effective pedagogic course on mediation.
While the thrust of the book is understandably on Conflict Resolution (exploiting the time-tested African palaver theory), the greater challenge still lies on the Conflict Prevention mechanism that the Organization of Africa Unity (now African Union) adopted during the Cairo 1993 summit.
With three of the five civil war case studies mentioned in the book (Uganda, Burundi, Sudan) still raging on and a swelling number (Zimbabwe, Somalia, Chad, Kenya, Darfur, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia), silencing ballots and summoning bullets, the need to restructure or professionalize all mediation stakeholders (individual or institutional) in Africa has become very urgent. Africa needs to combine both an early warning network (during elections and constitutional engineering) especially as I agree with the author that “African civil wars are rooted in disputes over power, identities and resources” (p. 254),and a fire – fighting brigade (when wars break out) to minimize or serve as damage control. The amount of money that donors spend (more that 1 million dollars a day on humanitarian assistance in Southern Sudan, p.230) on settling disputes can effectively be employed in the conflict prevention phases.
In all, the book is about the trials and triumphs of local mediations and home grown mediators; their failures are indicators of how complex conflict management can be, and their success how relevant the “language of ownership” and “endogenous power” are contingent on African disputes.
The book is a rainbow history of men and organizations of courage and vision who out of personal commitment and institutional sacrifice have placed their resources at the doorsteps of a turbulent Eastern Africa from 1985 – 2005.
Far from celebrating Africa’s success in mediation, except for some of the quotations at the beginning of each chapter which excel in unbridled conceit, international posturing and illusions of grandeur” Khadiagala is consistently frank, head on, and modestly pedagogic on the various case studies that continue to vindicate Tony Blair’s derogatory epithet of Africa being “the scar on the conscience of humanity”.
Be that as it may, the book seeks to prove that with diplomatic activism and moral mettle of elder statesmen mentioned in the book (Nyerere, Mwinyi, Mandela and Sumbeiymo) and with others like Kofi Annan, Salim Ahmed Salim and Graca Machel, as well as the organizational capacities of institutions like the IGAD Secretariat, Africa’s dispute industry does not need to go too far to find Oscar Arias and Jimmy Carter. They are right in Africa’s backyard provided Africans learn to winnow powerful meddlers from professional mediators.
The book is not only recommended for scholars of Peace, History, Politics and African studies but a must read and keep for Africa’s present and future leadership.
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